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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the impact of quantiles on optimal strate-
gies under state dynamics driven by both individual noise, common noise
and Poisson jumps. We first establish an optimality system satisfied the
quantile process under jump terms. We then turn to investigate a new
class of finite horizon mean-field games with common noise in which the
payoff functional and the state dynamics are dependent not only on the
state-action pair but also on conditional quantiles. Based on the best-
response of the decision-makers, it is shown that the equilibrium condi-
tional quantile process satisfies a stochastic partial differential equation in
the non-degenerate case. A closed-form expression of the quantile process
is provided in a basic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with common noise.
1 Introduction
Recent research has shown the importance of global uncertainty or common
noise in mean-field games. This motivates the question of whether the risk
associated to the uncertainty can be quantified. The quantile is one of the key
quantity-of-interests and serves as a baseline for many performance metrics used
in risk quantification. We ask whether the existing tools from mean-field games
can be modified to accommodate the quantiles in the payoff functionals and in
the dynamics of the states. We refer to such dynamic interaction as quantile-
based mean-field games. In such games the behavior of the decision maker
depends on the state, jump, common noise and quantiles. As the decision
affects the state transitions and the quantile, the quantile in turn influences
the individual state. It is convenient to have the evolution of the quantile for
computing optimal strategies of the decision-makers.
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Related works on mean-field games with common noise
Anonymous sequential and mean-field games with common noise can be con-
sidered as a natural generalization of the mean-field game problems (see [2, 3]
and the references therein). The works in [5, 6] considered mean-field games
with common noise and obtained optimality system that determine mean-field
equilibria conditioned of the information. The work in [7] provides sufficiency
conditions for well-posedness of mean-field games with common noise. Exis-
tence of solutions of the resulting stochastic optimality systems are examined in
[8, 9, 10]. A probabilistic approach to the master equation is developed in [11].
In order to determine the optimal strategies of the decision-maker, the previous
works used a maximum principle or a master equation which involves a Fokker-
Planck equation (see [12, 13, 14] and the references therein). Due to the inverse
nature of the quantile, it is not straightforward to use the master equation pro-
posed in earlier works [12, 13]. The results obtained in [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
for well-posedness, existence and moment estimates do not directly apply to the
quantile-based metrics, except under very strong assumptions. The methodol-
ogy used here extends the work in [4] that is for uncontrolled systems without
jump terms.
In this paper we address the question of finding a forward equation satisfied
by the quantile of measure-dependent stochastic differential equations with jump
terms. The main difficulty lies in expressing the propagation of the common
noise to the distribution of states with jump terms. The presence of the global
(common) noise creates random mean-field quantities: the mean-field limit is a
random measure, the conditional mean is random, the cumulative distribution
as well as the quantiles are random processes.
Contribution
The contribution of the present work can be summarized as follows.
• We introduce a new class of mean-field games with common noise and Le´vy
jumps where the payoff functions and the state dynamics are described
based upon conditional quantiles and jumps.
• We examine the conditional quantile process as a result of a mean-field
interaction in presence of individual and common noise. We use Itoˆ’s
calculus and implicit function theorem to derive a simple formula for the
quantile process.
• The methodology is illustrated in a simple auction mechanism in which
the state dynamics mimic a controlled Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with a
common noise. The common noise here captures the market uncertainty.
The decision-makers are prosumers (consumer-producer) who can submit
their bids and the respective bids that are below the market price may be
selected depending on the quantity needed by the operator to compensate
the mismatch between supply and demand in peak hours. By a direct
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decomposition method, we compute the quantile process when the opti-
mal strategies are employed. We provide a closed-form expression of the
quantile process in presence of common noise and show that it satisfies
the new dynamics established in Proposition 1 and 2.
Organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a generic
game model based on quantiles and with a common noise. Section 3 focuses
on existence and well-posedness problems. Section 4 presents the main tech-
nical results. In Section 5 we provide a basic application to dynamic auction
mechanism with common noise. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Table 1 summarizes the notations used in the paper.
2 Quantile-based mean-field game
Consider the following mean-field game with common noise. The set of decision-
makers is I = {1, 2, . . .}. Let T > 0, the interval [0, T ] is the horizon of the
interaction. The state space is S = R. The set of probability measures on S is
denoted by ∆(S). For each decision-maker i, a non-empty control action set A
is available. An instant payoff of decision-maker i is
r(si,m
f , ai) : S × L1([0, T ]× (0, 1),R)×A→ R, (1)
where si is the state of i, m
f is the quantile process, ai is the control action of i
at time t and L1([0, T ]× (0, 1),R) is the set of integrable processes from [0, T ]×
(0, 1) to R. The dynamics of the state is explicitly given by an Itoˆ’s stochastic
differential equation of Liouville type that is dependent on the quantile, and has
a jump and a common noise term.
si(t) = si0 +
∫ t
0
b¯dt′ +
∫ t
0
σdBi(t
′) +
∫ t
0
σodBo(t
′)
+
∫ t
0
∫
Θ
γN˜i(dt
′, dθ),
(2)
with si(0) = si0 ∈ S, and
b¯, σ, σo(si,m
f , ai) : S × L1([0, T ]× (0, 1),R)×A→ R, (3)
where b¯ is the drift coefficient functional, σ is the diffusion coefficient functional
related to the individual noise, σo is the diffusion coefficient functional related
to the common noise of the game, γ is the jump rate. Bi, Bo are independent
standard Brownian motions on a given probability space (Ω,F, {Ft},P). Bi, N˜i
represent the local uncertainties of decision-maker i and Bo is a common noise
or global uncertainty. Ft is the natural filtration generated by si0, Bi, Ni, Bo.
Denote by FBot the natural filtration generated by the common noise Bo. A
solution to the state equation will be denoted by si(t) := s
si0,ai,m
f
i (t). The
process mf is the f−quantile associated to the random measure
m(t, ds) = L(si(t) | FBo,m
f
t ) = Psi(t) | FBo,mft
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Table 1: Table of Notations
I , set of decision-makers
T , Length of the horizon
[0, T ] , horizon of the mean-field
game
t , time index.
S , state space
si(t) , state of i at time t
∆(S) , set of probability mea-
sures on S
m(t, .) , conditional probability
measure
of the state at time t
f fraction in (0, 1)
mf (t, .) , conditional quantile pro-
cess of si(t)
A , action set of decision-
maker i ∈ I
ai(.) , strategy of decision-maker
i ∈ I
b¯(si,m
f , ai) , drift coefficient function
σ(si,m
f , ai) , individual diffusion coeffi-
cient function
σo(si,m
f , ai) , global diffusion coefficient
function
γ(si,m
f , ai, θ) , individual jump rate coef-
ficient function
r(si,m
f , ai) , instant payoff of decision-
maker i ∈ I
gi(si,m
f ) , terminal payoff of
decision-maker i ∈ I
Ri,T (m0, ai,mf ) , cumulative payoff of i
(pi, qi, qo, r¯) , first-order adjoint process
of i ∈ I
Hi , r + bpi + σqi + σoqo +∫
Θ
γr¯µ(dθ) of i ∈ I
Hi,s , ri,s+ b¯spi+σsqi+σo,sqo+∫
Θ
γsr¯µ(dθ)
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which is the conditional law of the state si(t) given FBo,m
f
t . The quantile process
is
mf (t) = Qsi(t)(t, f) = inf {p ∈ R : f ≤ F (t, p)} ,
where F (t, p) = m(t, (−∞, p]) is the conditional cumulative distribution, this
solves F (t,mf (t)) = f even when F has some flat regions or discontinuity. Ni
is a Poisson random measure with Le´vy measure µ(dθ), independent of Wi and
the measure µ is a σ−finite measure over Θ. N˜i(dt, dθ) = Ni(dt, dθ)− µ(dθ)dt.
The jump rate functional is
γ : S × L1([0, T ]× (0, 1),R)×A×Θ→ R.
One of the key questions addressed in this paper is to find the dynamics
of the quantile process mf . Note that, the function σo(si,m
f , ai) depends on
the state, quantile and the control action. This helps to capture some scenarios
where the common noise influences each of the decision-makers, but the way it
is perceived may be different from one decision-maker to another.
The quantile mean-field game is played as follows. Given a initial state
si0 which is drawn from the initial distribution m0, the game G(si0) proceeds
as follows. At each instant, each decision-maker observes the state (perfect
monitoring, perfect state observation), chooses a control action according her
strategy (defined below) and observes/measures her payoff.
An admissible control of decision-maker i ∈ I is progressively measurable
and integrable process with respect to the filtration Ft := Fs0,Bo,B,m
f
t , taking
values in A. We denote the set of all admissible control strategy of decision-
maker i by A :
A = {ai ∈ L1F(Ω× [0, T ],R); ai(., t) ∈ A, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]}
where L1F(Ω × [0, T ],R) is the set of all progressively F−measurable and inte-
grable R−valued processes defined on [0, T ]. We identify two processes ai and
a˜i in A if
P(ai = a˜i, a.e. on [0, T ]) = 1.
A quantile-based strategy for decision-maker i starting at time 0 is a Borel-
measurable map (renamed again by)
ai : [0, T ]× C([0, T ],S)× L1([0, T ]× (0, 1),R)→ A
for which there exists  > 0 such that for any (t, f1, f2) ∈ (0, T ]×{C([0, T ],S)×
L1([0, T ]×(0, 1),R)}2, if f1 = f2 on [0, t] then ai(., f1) = ai(., f2) on [0, t+]. To
each strategy profile one can associate a control process profile. This will allow
us to work with both open-loop and feedback form of strategies by considering
ai(., s
si0,ai
i ,m
f ). The cumulative payoff of decision-maker i is
Ri,T (si0, ai,mf ) :=
g(si(T ),m
f (T )) +
∫ T
0
r(si(t),m
f (t), ai(t)) dt,
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where gi(si(T ),m
f (T )) is the terminal payoff of i. The risk-neutral payoff of i is
E[Ri,T (m0, ai,mf )]. The risk-neutral quantile-based mean-field game G0,T,f (si0)
is the normal-form game G0,T,f (si0) = (I, (A,ERi,T )i∈I).
Best response to quantile process
Each decision-maker i revises her strategy and responds to the stochastic quan-
tile process mf and chooses her best response strategy ai by solving
supai∈A E[Ri,T (si0, ai,mf )],
si(t) := s
si0,ai,m
f
i (t) solves (2),
si(0) = si0 ∼ m0.
(4)
A strategy a∗i such that E[Ri,T (si0, a∗i ,mf )] = supai∈A E[Ri,T (si0, ai,mf )], is
called a best response to the quantile process mf . The set of best response
strategies of decision-maker i is denoted by BR(mf ).
Quantile-based Mean-Field Equilibrium
Define the following equilibrium point problem: Find (a∗i ,m
f ) ∈ A× L1, i ∈ I
such that for every decision-maker i one has a∗i ∈ BR(mf ) and mf coincides
with mf∗(t) = inf {p ∈ R : m∗(t, (−∞, p]) ≥ f} , where
m∗(t, ds) = P
s∗1(t) | F
Bo,m
f∗
t
.
The difference between the best response problem and the equilibrium prob-
lem is that, in the former the conditional quantile process mf is given, the latter
can be seen as a fixed-point as the conditional quantile is the quantile condi-
tioned on the distribution and the common noise, which in turn, is obtained
from the states of the individuals.
3 Well-posedness
Well-posedness of the state equation: The state dynamics of decision-maker i is
the following controlled Liouville system:
dsi = b¯(si,m
f , ai)dt+ σ(si,m
f , ai)dBi(t)
+σ0(si,m
f , ai)dBo(t) +
∫
Θ
γN˜i(dt, dθ),
si(0) = si0 ∼ m0,
mf (t) = inf {p ∈ R : m(t, (−∞, p]) ≥ f} ,
m(t, ds) = P
s∗1(t) | FBo,m
f
t
,
(5)
where f ∈ (0, 1), m0 is the initial measure. The probability law of si(t) is
E[φ(si)|FBo,mt ] = E[φ(s1(t)) | FBo,mt ].
In order to provide a sufficiency condition for existence of solution to (9) we
impose the following assumption:
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H0: the coefficient functions b¯, σo, σ are continuous functions, uniformly Lip-
schitz in the first component s, twice continuously differentiable in si, σ non-
singular, si(0) is L
1-integrable and indistinguishable (invariance in distribution
per permutation of index).
Lemma 1 (Existence). Under H0, there exists a positive function of time, β,
such that
sup
t′∈[0,t]
E[|si(t′)|+ |mf (t′)|] < β(f, t).
There exists at least one solution to (9).
The proof is by now standard using linear growth recursion, and is therefore
omitted. Uniqueness to (9) is an open issue. This is because we do not have
an estimate bound of the quantile: we are lacking an estimate bound for the
quantity |b¯(s1,mf1 , ai)− b¯(s2,mf2 , ai)| as it involves an inverse term.
Stochastic Fokker-Planck Equation: It is important to notice that the con-
ditional law s∗i (t) | FBo,m
f
t is not a deterministic distribution. The random
distribution m(t, ds) solves a stochastic Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation
of mean-field type. By Itoˆ’s formula, m(t, s) solves the following stochastic
partial differential equation (SPDE) in a weak sense: For any bounded Borel-
measurable function (test function) φ,
∫
s∈R φ(s)m(t, ds) =
∫
s∈R φ(s)m(0, ds)
+
∫ t
0
∫
s∈R{[σ
2+σ2o
2 ]φss + b¯φs}m(dt′, ds)
+
∫ t
0
∫
s∈R σoφsm(t
′, ds)dBo(t′)
+
∫ t
0
〈J [φ],m〉dt′,
(6)
where
J [φ] :=
∫
Θ
{φ(s(t−)+γ(t−, s(t−), θ))−φ(s(t−))−φs.γ(t−, s(t−), θ)1l{|s|<}}µ(dθ),
and the adjoint J∗ of the operator J is given by
〈J [φ],m〉 = 〈φ, J∗[m]〉.
Lemma 2 (Conditional density). The conditional density is stochastic and
solves the stochastic integro-PDE given by
dm = {−(b¯m)s + 12 (σ2m)ss + 12σ2omss + J∗[m]}dt−σomsdBo, (7)
Proof. To establish the stochastic integro-Fokker-Planck equation, we use the
decomposition si(t) = si,nc(t) + si,c(t) as common part and individual noises
part with
si,nc(t) =
∫ t
0
b¯dt′ +
∫ t
0
σdBi(t
′) +
∫ t
0
∫
Θ
γdN˜i(dt
′, dθ),
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si,c(t) = s0 +
∫ t
0
σodBo(t
′).
The probability law of si(t) |FBo,s0t can be expressed in terms of probability of
si,nc(t) :
mnc(snc) = mnc(s− sc) = mnc(s− s0 −
∫ t
0
σodBo(t
′))
We apply Itoˆ’s formula to the latter expression to derive the following:
dm = [mnc,t +
σ2o
2
mss]dt− σomsdBo(t).
The forward equation for the individual noises part mnc solves
mnc,t = −(b¯mnc)s + 1
2
(σ2mnc)ss + J
∗[mnc].
Hence the announced result.
Solving McKean-Vlasov type SPDE is not a trivial task. Next, we provide a
simple approximation of the distribution using virtual agents. Let the strategy
ai be a progressively measurable and functional of si,m
f . Then, the coefficient
functions can be rewritten as
b¯(si,m
f , ai) = b˜(si,m
f ), σ(si,m
f , ai) = σ˜(si,m
f ),
σo(si,m
f , ai) = σ˜o(si,m
f ),
γ(si,m
f , ai, θ) = σ˜o(si,m
f , θ).
The random measure m can be approximated by an empirical measure process
m(t, ds) = lim
n→+∞ m
n(t, ds) = lim
n→+∞
1
n
∑
i∈I
δsi(t)

dsni = s
n
i (0) +
∫ t
0
b˜(sni ,m
f,n)dt′
+
∫ t
0
σ˜(sni ,m
f,n)dBi(t
′) +
∫ t
0
σ˜o(s
n
i ,m
f,n)dBo(t
′)
+
∫ t
0
∫
Θ
γ˜(sni ,m
f,n, θ)N˜i(dt
′, dθ),
sni (0) = s
n
i0 ∼ mn0 ,
mf,n(t) = inf {s ∈ R : mn(t, (−∞, s]) ≥ f} ,
mn(t, .) = 1n
∑
i∈I δsi(t),
i ∈ I.
(8)
We use an Euler-Maruyama method over the discrete time space 1nZ∩ [0, T ].
By de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage’s theorem [16, 15], it is well-known that there is a
random m such that mn converges in distribution to m. Moreover, conditioning
on m, the weak convergence of sni is obtained by the convergence of the empir-
ical mf,n(t). These solutions are extended step by step from interval [ kn ,
k+1
n ]
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to [k+1n ,
k+2
n ]. Furthermore, we know that the limiting random measure solves
the stochastic Fokker-Planck equation (6), it remains to identify an equation
satisfied by the quantile process. To do so, we again impose a certain regularity
of coefficient functions to get a positive measure that is continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue and that does not vanish on open set.
4 Main Results
This section presents our technical main result.
Quantile Dynamics with Jumps
The next result presents the key quantile dynamics and its relationship with m
and ms.
Proposition 1. Under H0, the quantile process mf solves the following stochas-
tic differential equation:
mf (t) = mf (0+) +
∫ t
0+
b˜(mf ,mf )dt′
+
∫ t
0+
σ˜o(m
f ,mf )dBo(t
′)− ∫ t
0+
σ˜σ˜s(m
f ,mf )dt′
− 12
∫ t
0+
σ˜2(mf ,mf )ms(t
′,mf )
m(t′,mf ) dt
′
− ∫ t
0+
∫
Θ
γ˜(mf , θ)γ˜s(m
f , θ)µ(dθ)dt′
− 12
∫ t
0+
ms(t
′,mf )
m(t′,mf )
∫
Θ
γ˜2µ(dθ)dt′.
(9)
The structure of the quantile process was proved in [4] in the controlled-
independent and jump-free case (γ = 0). Proposition 1 extends the work in
[4] to include state-quantile feedback control case with jumps under suitable
conditions imposed in H0.
Proof. In Appendix.
Since the ratio msm can be written as (logm)s, we obtain
dmf = b˜(mf ,mf )dt
−σ˜σ˜s(mf ,mf )dt
− 12 (logm)sσ˜2(mf ,mf )dt− ∫
Θ
γ˜(mf ,mf , θ)γ˜s(m
f ,mf , θ)µ(dθ)dt
− 12 (logm)s
∫
Θ
γ˜2(mf ,mf , θ)µ(dθ)dt
+σ˜o(m
f ,mf )dBo(t).
(10)
Remark 1. Noting that m is a random measure given by m(t, ds) = P
si(t) | FBo,mft
which is the conditional distribution of si(t) given the filtration FBo,m
f
t = σ(Bo(t
′),mf (t′), t′ ≤
t), we obtain mf as a random process satisfying (10). When there is no com-
mon noise σo → 0, the individual and independent Brownian motions will gen-
erate a deterministic quantile if the strategies adopted by the decision-makers
are adapted to FBit . From (10), the deterministic quantile evolution is given by
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
m˙f (t) = b˜(mf ,mf )
−σ˜σ˜s(mf ,mf )
− 12 (logm)sσ˜2(mf ,mf )− ∫
Θ
γ˜(mf ,mf , θ)γ˜s(m
f ,mf , θ)µ(dθ)
− 12 (logm)s
∫
Θ
γ˜2(mf ,mf , θ)µ(dθ).
(11)
Example 1 (Gaussian Quantile). Let Z ∼ N (0, 1). The unit Gaussian f -
quantile function QZ is the function satisfying the condition FZ(QZ(f)) = f, for
all f ∈ (0, 1). This function QZ(f) is not available in simple closed-form, nor
the expression of the inverse error function erf−1(f). However, its properties are
well understood through its characterization as the solution of the non-linear or-
dinary differential equation with boundary conditions. In the case of a Gaussian
distribution snc(t) = µ(t)+σ(t)Z, with mean µ(t) and variance σ
2(t), the quan-
tile function of that distribution is then Qsnc(t, f) = µ(t) + σ(t)QZ(f). Clearly,
this solves the system (10).
Example 2. Consider the hyperbolic tangent function tanh(s) = e
s−e−s
es+e−s . This
is clearly a bounded function and its range is in [−1, 1]. Its derivative is
tanhs(s) =
(es + e−s)2 − (es − e−s)2
(es + e−s)2
=
4
(es + e−s)2
=
1
( e
s+e−s
2 )
2
=
1
cosh2(s)
= 1− tanh2(s),
which is again bounded and ranges in [0, 1]. Let δ > 0 and the drift b¯ to be the
hyperbolic tangent function δtanh(δs). Then, b¯ is continuously differentiable,
its derivative δ2[1 − tanh2(δs)] is bounded with range in [0, δ2]. We assume
σ, σo, γ(θ) are independent of si,m
f . Theses functions are differentiable and
their derivative (with respect to si,m
f ) are zero, hence continuous and bounded.
Thus, (b, σ, σo, γ) fulfill the conditions in H0. We choose γ(θ) = θ. The state
dynamics is
dsi = δtanh(δsi)dt+ σidBi + σodBo +
∫
Θ
θN˜(dt, dθ).
with Θ = R, The operator J is
J [φ] :=
∫
R
{φ(s(t) + θ)− φ(s(t))}µ(dθ),
and the adjoint J∗ of the operator J is given by
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
〈J [φ],m〉 = 〈φ, J∗[m]〉
=
∫
s∈R
∫
θ∈R{φ(s+ θ)− φ(s)}µ(dθ)m(s)ds
= −[∫ µ(θ)dθ] ∫ φ(s) m(s)ds+ ∫
s∈R[
∫
θ∈R φ(s+ θ)µ(θ)dθ]m(s)ds
= −λ ∫ φ(s) m(s)ds+ ∫
s∈R[
∫
y∈R φ(y)µ(y − s)dy]m(s)ds
= −λ ∫ φ(s) m(s)ds+ ∫
y∈R φ(y)dy[
∫
s∈R µ(y − s)m(s)ds]
= −λ ∫ φ(s) m(s)ds+ ∫
s∈R φ(s)ds[
∫
z∈R µ(−z)m(s+ z)dz]
= −λ ∫ φ(s) m(s)ds+ ∫
s∈R φ(s)ds[
∫
θ∈R µ(θ)m(s− θ)dθ]
=
∫
φ(s)ds[−λm(s) + ∫
θ∈R µ(θ)m(s− θ)dθ]
(12)
where λ =
∫
µ(θ)dθ, µ(dθ) = λµ˜(θ)dθ and µ˜(θ), is a probability density function.
By identification,{
J∗[m] = −λm(s) + ∫
θ∈R µ(θ)m(s− θ)dθ
= −λm(s) + λ ∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)m(s− θ)dθ
(13)
The stochastic integro-Fokker-Planck equation yields
dm(t, s) = {−(b¯m)s + 12 (σ2m)ss + 12σ2omss}dt
+[−λm(t, s) + λ ∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)m(t, s− θ)dθ]dt
−σomsdBo,
(14)
Set m(t, s) = mnc(t, s− s0 − σoBo(t)). Then
mnc,t = −δ(tanh(δs)mnc)s + 1
2
(σ2m)nc,ss
−λmnc(t, s) + λ
∫
θ∈R
µ˜(θ)mnc(t, s− θ)dθ
Let compute mnc. We try a solution in the following form:
mnc(t, s) =
1
2
[eδs−
1
2 δ
2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc(t, s).
By differentiating with respect to t, one gets{
mnc,t =
1
2 [− 12δ2eδs−
1
2 δ
2t − 12δ2e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc +
1
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,t
= − δ24 [eδs−
1
2 δ
2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc +
1
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,t
(15)
Since 
1
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]δtanh(δs)
= δ
2(eδs+e−δs) [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t][eδs − e−δs]
= δ2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t],
we obtain
δ(tanh(δs)mnc)s = δ(tanh(δs)
1
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc)s
= ( δ2 (e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t)m˜nc)s
= δ
2
2 (e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t)m˜nc +
δ
2 (e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t)m˜nc,s
(16)
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
mnc,s =
δ
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t]m˜nc + 12 [eδs−
1
2 δ
2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,s,
mnc,ss =
δ2
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc +
δ
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t]m˜nc,s
+ δ2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t]m˜nc,s + 12 [eδs−
1
2 δ
2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,ss
= δ
2
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc +
2δ
2 [e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t]m˜nc,s
+ 12 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,ss
(17)
{
1
2 (σ
2mnc)ss =
δ2σ2
4 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc +
2δσ2
4 [e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t]m˜nc,s
+σ
2
4 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,ss
(18)
Putting together we obtain

− δ24 [eδs−
1
2 δ
2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc
+ 12 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,t
= − δ22 (eδs−
1
2 δ
2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t)m˜nc
− δ2 (eδs−
1
2 δ
2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t)m˜nc,s
+ δ
2σ2
4 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc
+ 2δσ
2
4 [e
δs− 12 δ2t − e−δs− 12 δ2t]m˜nc,s
+σ
2
4 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,ss
−λ2 [eδs−
1
2 δ
2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc
+λ
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
δ(s−θ)− 12 δ2t + e−δ(s−θ)−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ
(19)
By choosing σ = 1, the latter system is reduced to

+ 12 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,t
= +σ
2
4 [e
δs− 12 δ2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc,ss
−λ2 [eδs−
1
2 δ
2t + e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc
+λ
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
δ(s−θ)− 12 δ2t + e−δ(s−θ)−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ
(20)
Thus, the system becomes
{
m˜nc,t =
1
2m˜nc,ss − λm˜nc
+ 2λ
eδs−
1
2
δ2t+e−δs−
1
2
δ2t
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
δ(s−θ)− 12 δ2t + e−δ(s−θ)−
1
2 δ
2t]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ
(21)
By simplifying by e−
1
2 δ
2t, we obtain{
m˜nc,t =
1
2m˜nc,ss − λm˜nc
+ 2λ
eδs+e−δs
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
δ(s−θ) + e−δ(s−θ)]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ (22)
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We now decompose the term 12 [e
δ(s−θ) + e−δ(s−θ)] using parallelogram law:
1
2
[eδ(s−θ) + e−δ(s−θ)] =
1
2
[eδs + e−δs].
1
2
[e−δθ + eδθ] +
1
2
[eδs− e−δs].1
2
[e−δθ − eδθ]
By expanding the terms we arrive at
m˜nc,t =
1
2m˜nc,ss − λm˜nc
+ 2λ
eδs+e−δs
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
δs + e−δs]. 12 [e
−δθ + eδθ]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ
+ 2λ
eδs+e−δs
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
δs − e−δs]. 12 [e−δθ − eδθ]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ
(23)

m˜nc,t =
1
2m˜nc,ss − λm˜nc
+λ
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
−δθ + eδθ]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ
+λ tanh(δs)
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
−δθ − eδθ]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ
(24)
The term
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
−δθ−eδθ]m˜nc(t, s−θ)dθ vanishes. It remains to solve the
following system:{
m˜nc,t =
1
2m˜nc,ss − λm˜nc + λ
∫
θ∈R µ˜(θ)
1
2 [e
−δθ + eδθ]m˜nc(t, s− θ)dθ (25)
This is latter system is the Fokker-Planck equation associated to the process
B(t) +
∫
R θN(t, dθ) where N is a Poisson jump process with jump rate θ and
with Le´vy measure µˆ(θ) := 12 [e
−δθ + eδθ]µˆ(θ). Denote by µ˜N (t, s) the probability
density of N(t, .) and by µ˜B(t, s) the probability density of B(t). Then, the m˜nc
is explicitly given by
m˜nc(., s) = [µ˜B ∗ µ˜N ](., s) =
∫
y
µ˜B(t, s− y)µ˜N ](t, y)dy,
where ∗ denotes the convolution operator.
mnc(t, s) =
1
2
[eδs−
1
2 δ
2t+e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t][µ˜B∗µ˜N ](t, s) = 1
2
[eδs−
1
2 δ
2t+e−δs−
1
2 δ
2t]
∫
y
µ˜B(t, s−y)µ˜N (t, y)dy
Thus, the closed-form expression is
m(t, s) = mnc(t, s− s0 − σoBo(t)) =
1
2
[eδs−δs0−δσoBo(t)−
1
2 δ
2t+e−δs+δs0+δσoBo(t)−
1
2 δ
2t]
∫
y
µ˜B(t, s−s0−σoBo(t)−y)µ˜N (t, y)dy
The quantile system reduces to{
dmf = [δtanh(δmf )− 12 (logm)s − 12 (logm)s
∫
Θ
θµ(dθ)]dt
+σodBo(t).
(26)
When δ vanishes, the quantile becomes mf (t) = s0+σoBo(t)+F
−1
B(t)+
∫
R θN(t,dθ)
(f),
where F−1X is the quantile associated to the mixed process X(t) = B(t)+
∫
R θN(t, dθ).
It is easily to check that the latter expression solves the quantile SDE (10).. It is
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well-known that the Wasserstein distance W2 between two distributions µ0 and
µ1 is related to the quantile process in one-dimensional case via the relation
W 22 (µ0, µ1) =
∫ 1
0
[F−10 (s)−F−11 (s)]2ds =
∫ 1
0
[QX0(s)−QX1(s)(s)]2ds =
∫ 1
0
[mf0−mf1 ]2df.
Based on the explicit representation of the quantile one can target best response
problems such as infai W2(Ltargeti ,mT ).
Stochastic maximum principle
Let (p, q, q0, r¯) be the adjoint processes associated to the drift, individual diffu-
sion, common diffusion and jump terms respectively. Let H be the Pontryagin
function
H(t, si,m
f , p, q, qo, r¯) = r + b¯p+ σq + σoqo +
∫
Θ
γr¯(., θ)µ(dθ).
Define the first order adjoint process as
dp = −Hsdt+ qdBi + qodBo +
∫
Θ
r¯(., θ)N˜i(dt, dθ),
p(T ) = gs(si(T ),m
f (T )),
where Hs is a notation for rs + b¯sp+ σsq + σo,sqo +
∫
Θ
γsr¯(., θ)µ(dθ) evaluated
at the best response strategy,
ψs(t) = ∂sψ(t, s
∗
i (t),m
f (t), a∗i (t)), ψ ∈ {r, b¯, σo, σ},
is the partial derivative with respect to s.
Proposition 2. If the functions b, σ, σo, r, g are continuously differentiable with
respect to (si,m
f ), all their first-order derivatives with respect to (si,m
f ) are
continuous in (si,m
f , ai), and bounded. Then, the first-order adjoint system is
a linear SDE with almost surely bounded coefficient functions. There is a unique
FBo,B,N,s0−adapted solution such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|p(t)|2+
∫ T
0
(|q(t)|2 + |qo(t)|2+
∫
Θ
r¯2µ(dθ))dt
]
< +∞.
Proof. Assume conditionsH0 hold. Then, one obtain a linear SDE in (p, q, qo, r¯).
In addition, the coefficient of the linear SDE of Liouiville type has almost surely
bounded coefficient function. Such a linear SDE ha a solution. From martingale
representation theorem, there is unique solution that is FBo,B,N,s0−adapted so-
lution such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|p(t)|2+
∫ T
0
(|q(t)|2 + |qo(t)|2+
∫
Θ
r¯2µ(dθ))dt
]
< +∞.
These strong smoothness conditions on b, σ, σo, r, g can be considerably weak-
ened using representations of weak sub/super-differential sets.
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5 Illustrative Example
In this section we examine a basic mean-field game with common noise. The
energy sector is evolving with the involvement of prosumers. A prosumer
(producer-consumer) is a user that not only consumes electricity, but can also
produce and store electricity. We examine how the prosumer energy market can
be used to compensate a portion of peak hours energy (NegaWatts). NegaWatts
is the amount of demand they shift from peak to off-peak time. The prosumers
can contribute to the NegaWatts using their own storage or by selling energy to
the operators, which creates a prosumer market within the global energy mar-
ket. Figure 1 illustrates a situation in which the prosumer market contribution
needs to be particularly important between 5pm and 9pm where the production
capacity of the energy operators is exceeded. The work in [1] proposed indi-
vidual risk in mean-field control with application to demand response. Their
model is a leader-follower mean-field model in which the leader makes decisions
based on quantiles. However, their model differs from the common noise model
of mean-field games considered in this paper.
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Figure 1: Prosumer market can be used to compensate the demand during peak
hours between 5pm and 9pm.
Multi-Winner Auction
We consider a dynamic interaction with N prosumers in an energy market who
adopted an auction mechanism to sell their extra energy to an operator who
needs that energy during peak hours. We are not imposing the lowest price
auction format because there is a total demand and the operator is looking for
a certain quantity to compensate the NegaWatts. As a consequence, several
prosumers may win the auction (Fig. 2). Let us denote the set of prosumers
by I = {1, . . . , n}. Let us assume that the n¯ lowest bids will be selected by
the operator, with n¯ ≤ n. The authority allows only positive prices (bids).
We change the scale and work with the log-price or log-bid in order to get a
wider spectrum that covers all real values. The log-bid of a prosumer belongs
15
Figure 2: Multi-Winner Auction between Prosumers
to (−∞,+∞) = R. This will open a possibility to model the log-bid through
unconstrained Brownian motions driven processes and allow us to derive explicit
solution.
Supply and Demand Matching
The interaction between the prosumers and the energy operator starts at time
0. At time step t, the energy operator needs a certain quantity to compensate
the demand of the customers (for example, during peak hours). The market
clearing condition is when demand equals supply and the bid is less than the
market price pn(t) at time t. The operator is looking for n¯Q¯(t) units of energy
at time t.The selected supply of the prosumers at time t is
Q¯(t)
∑
i∈I
1l{log bi(t)≤log pn}.
We define the mean-field process of the finite population as
mnt =
1
n
∑
i∈I
δlog bi(t).
The demand equals supply if Q¯(t)
∑
i∈I 1l{log bi(t)≤log pn} = n¯(t)Q¯(t), i.e.,
∫ log pn
−∞ m
n(t, db) =
n¯
n . This means that m
n[t, (−∞, log pn]] = n¯n .
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As the quantities are larger, and the scales are chosen such that n¯n goes to
a fraction f of quantity of energy available to the market. The global market
price becomes the f−quantile process mf of the measure m that is the limit
of the empirical distribution mn of the log bids. Define the quantile associated
to the fraction f at time t, as mf (t) = Q(t, f) = inf {p ∈ R : f ≤ F (t, p)} ,
where F (t, p) = m(t, (−∞, log p]) is the cumulative distribution, this solves
F (t,mf (t)) = f, even when F has some flat regions or discontinuous. Note that
the distribution m will be stochastic due to the global market uncertainty. It
allows us to capture a range of prosumer behaviors for the energy of the future.
Each prosumer wants to be among the winners of the auction, the ones chosen
by the operator and therefore the bids should be below the market price p and
the prosumer supply should match the fraction quantity f. The winners gets a
reward which is 1 when a1 ≤ a2 ≤ . . . an¯ ≤ pn and the total quantity n¯Q¯(t)
units that the operator is looking for is achieved.
Log-bid dynamics with common noise
Here the state of prosumer i at time t is si(t), which represents the log bid
of prosumer i. si is a stochastic process and solves the stochastic differential
equation (2) of quantile-type with common noise with the drift function b¯ =
α(mf − si) + [ai −mf ]+, σo(t) and σ(t) are independent of si,mf . Prosumer i
aims to optimize the waste of the remaining energy by selling it in the prosumer
market. The auction ends at time T. The optimal control strategy is trivial
in this case and it is given by a∗i (t) = m
f (t), which is the conditional quantile
process. The state dynamics becomes a sort of time-inhomogeneous Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck (O-U) process (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Samples of Log-bid in the prosumer market.
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5.0.1 Uniqueness of the state
For any given L1-processmf the state dynamics admits a unique solution. Below
we provide the solution in closed-form expression.
5.0.2 Closed-form expression of the state
Let χi such that
eαtχi(t) = α
∫ t
0
eαt
′
mfdt′ +
∫ t
0
eαt
′
σodBo(t
′)
+si0 +
∫ t
0
eαt
′
σdBi(t
′).
Then, dχi = −αχidt+σdBi(t) +αmfdt+σodBo(t). It is easy to verify that
the above solution χ is unique in the sense that if there are two processes si and
χi solving the state dynamics then P(si(t) = χi(t), a.e.) = 1.
5.0.3 Closed-form expression of the optimal strategy
The equilibrium strategy is the conditional quantile a∗i (t) = m
f (t) which we
explicitly derive below. The solution si(t) is decomposed into individual noise
terms and common noise terms as
si(t) = χi(t) = si,c(t) + si,nc(t),
where
si,c(t) = e
−αt[α
∫ t
0
eαt
′
mfdt′ +
∫ t
0
eαt
′
σodBo(t
′)],
si,nc(t) = e
−αt[si0 +
∫ t
0
eαt
′
σdBi(t
′)].
Conditioning on the common noise part we compute
F (s) = P (si(t) ≤ s | si,c(t)) =
P (si,nc(t) ≤ s− si,c(t)| si,c(t)) = f.
Since si,nc(t) is a Gaussian process, the inverse of Φ(t, .) : x 7→ P (si,nc(t) ≤ x)
is uniquely determined and
s− si,c(t) = Φ−1(t, f) = µi,nc(t) + σnc(t)QZ(f),
with µi,nc(t) = e
−αtsi0 and σ2nc is the variance of snc(t).
Thus, mf (t) = si,c(t) + Φ
−1(t, f) = si,c(t) +mfnc(t), that is,
mf (t) = e−αt[α
∫ t
0
eαt
′
mfdt′ +
∫ t
0
eαt
′
σodBo(t
′)] +mfnc(t),
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where mfnc(t) is the quantile of the strictly individual noise part, i.e., the quantile
of the process
z0 = e
−αt[si0 +
∫ t
0
eαt
′
σdBi(t
′)].
Note that if the initial processes si0 are independent and identically distributed,
and independent of Bi then m
f
nc(t) the quantile of the process z0 is deterministic.
We compute the deterministic term thanks to Equation (10).
ms(t
′,mf )
m(t′,mf ) =
Fss(t
′,mf )
Fs(t′,mf )
=
Φss(t
′,mf−si,c)
Φs(t′,mf−si,c)
= − 1σ2nc (m
f − si,c − µnc) = − 1σ2nc(t)σnc(t)QZ(f)
= − 1σnc(t) QZ(f),
(27)
with  σ
2
nc(t) = var
[
e−αt
∫ t
0
eαt
′
σdBi(t
′)
]
= E
[
e−αt
∫ t
0
eαt
′
σdBi(t
′)
]2
= e−2αt
∫ t
0
e2αt
′
σ2dt′.
(28)
It is easily verified that the variance solves the ordinary differential equation:
ασnc + σ˙nc =
σ2
2σnc
. By Proposition 1 we check that
dmf = σodBo − σ22 ms(t,m
f )
m(t,mf )
dt
= σodBo +
σ2
2σnc(t)
QZ(f)dt,
= σodBo + (ασnc + σ˙nc)QZ(f)dt.
(29)
Using the latter equation we compute the operator cost during peak hours.
The mismatch between the supply So of the operator and the demand D of the
consumers creates the certain cost
c(T,D(T ), So(T )) = E[mf (T )(D(T )− So(T ))+]
which is obtained from the stochastic differential equation solved by the optimal
quantile process.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a new class of mean-field games called quantile-
based mean-field games. Due to the inverse nature of the quantile, the existing
methodologies previously developed for existence, uniqueness and moment esti-
mates fail, except under very strong assumptions. In this work, a weak solution
approach was proposed and a direct method was employed as an illustration.
Explicit closed-form expressions are provided a class of mean-field games with
tanh(.) as a drift function. However, number of issues remain to be addressed.
The term (logm)s plays a crucial role in the dynamics is not available in the
current formulation. In our future work, we plan to investigate possible repre-
sentation of the log-likelihood in terms mf without using directly m,ms.
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Proof of the Quantile Dynamics, Proposition 1
Consider the implicit equation with stochastic quantities q and m :
F (q,m) = P (si ≤ q)− f =
∫ q
−∞
m(s)ds− f = 0.
Assuming regularity we have the stochastic integro-PDE solved by m|Bo :{
dm = {−(b¯m)s + 12 (σ2m)ss + 12σ2omss + J∗[m]}dt−σomsdBo, (30)
Itoˆ’s formula applied to the implicit equation becomes 0 = dF= Ftdt+ Fqdq + Fm.dm
+ 12 [Fqqd〈q〉t + (Fqm + Fmq)d〈q,m〉t + Fmmd〈m〉t],
(31)
Note that Fq = m(t, q) which is stochastic quantity.
The main difficulty here is a theory of differentiation with respect to m.
We can use different notions such as Wasserstein gradient, Fre´chet derivative,
functional derivative, Gaˆteaux derivative. However, here, the derivative we will
need involve m(t, q) which is the conditional density evaluated to the quantile,
which is obviously a degenerate quantity. In order the make the differentiation
part self-content, we use a mollifier approximation of the conditional distribution
of si(t) | FBo,mt .
m(t, dy) = lim
(n,)→(+∞,0)
1
n
n∑
j=1
ρ(y − si),
where ρ(x) =
1
d
ρ(x ),
∫
x∈R ρ(x)dx = 1.
The implicit equation, by renaming F [n, ] =: F becomes
F (q, s) =
∫ q
−∞
1
n
n∑
j=1
ρ(y − si)dy − f = 0.
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Note that Fq(q, s1, . . . , sn) =
1
n
∑n
j=1 ρ(q − si) 6= 0 which is non-zero
stochastic quantity. Since Fq 6= 0, one can use the implicit function theorem
and it provides the existence of a local function q = q(f, s1, . . . , sn).
0 = dF
= Ftdt+ Fqdq + Fs.ds
+ 12{Fqqd〈q〉t
+
∑n
i=1(Fqsi + Fsiq)d〈q, si〉t + Fsisid〈si〉t}
(32)
We compute the first and second derivative terms that are needed in the Itoˆ’s
formula: 
Fq =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ρ(q − si),
Fqq =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ρ
′
(q − si),
Fsiq = − 1nρ′(q − si) = Fqsi ,
Fsi =
1
n
∫ q
−∞ ρ
′
(y − si)dy = − 1nρ(q − si),
Fsisi =
1
n
∫ q
−∞ ρ
′′
 (y − si)dy = 1nρ′(q − si),
(33)
Using the forward SDE solved by s we compute the following terms:
Fs.ds =
∑n
i=1 Fsidsi
=
∑n
i=1 Fsi [b¯dt+ σdBi + σodBo +
∫
Θ
γN˜i(dt, dθ)]
= −∑ni=1 1nρ(q − si)[b¯dt+ σdBi + σodBo + ∫Θ γN˜i(dt, dθ)] (34)
It follows that −Fqdq =
∑n
i=1 Fsi [b¯dt+ σdBi + σodBo +
∫
Θ
γN˜i(dt, dθ)]
+ 12{Fqqd〈q〉t
+
∑n
i=1(Fqsi + Fsiq)d〈q, si〉t + Fsisid〈si〉t}
(35)
By identification of the diffusion terms we obtain
dq = −∑ni=1 ( σFqFsi) dBi − (∑ni=1 σoFsiFq ) dBo
−
(
1
Fq
∑n
i=1 b¯Fsi
)
dt
−
(
1
Fq
∑n
i=1
∫
Θ
γN˜i(dt, dθ)Fsi
)
− 12Fq {Fqqd〈q〉t+∑n
i=1 2Fqsid〈q, si〉t + Fsisid〈si〉t}
(36)
Using the relation
∑
i Fsi = −Fq, and taking the limit we obtain
dq = b¯(q, q, a(q, .))dt+ σo(q, q, a(q, .))dBo
− lim ∑ni=1 ( σFqFsi) dBi
− lim ∑ni=1 ∫Θ γFsiFq N˜i(dt, dθ)
− lim 12Fq {Fqqd〈q〉t+∑n
i=1 2Fqsid〈q, si〉t + Fsisid〈si〉t}
(37)
We have limn, Fq = lim
1
n
∑n
j=1 ρ(q − si) = lim
∫
ρ(q − s)m(x)dx = m(q).
We now compute the quadratic variation terms
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
d〈q〉t = [(
∑
j σo(sj ,.)Fsj
Fq
)2 +
∑n
i=1
(
σ(si,.)
Fq
Fsi
)2
]dt
+
∑n
i=1
(∫
Θ
γ(si,.)µ(dθ)
Fq
Fsi
)2
]dt,
d〈q, si〉t = [σo(si, .)
(∑n
j=1 σo(sj ,.)Fsj
Fq
)
− σ2FqFsi ]dt
−[∫
Θ
γ2µ(dθ)
Fq
Fsi ]dt,
d〈si〉t = [σ2o(si, .) + σ2(si, .) +
∫
Θ
γ2(si, .)µ(dθ)]dt.
(38)
The limit of the second derivative Fqq is limFqq = lim
1
n
∑n
j=1 ρ
′
(q − si) =
lim
∫
ρ′(q− s)m(s)ds = lim
∫
ρ(q− s)ms(s)ds, where we have used an integra-
tion by part. 
−Fqq2Fq d〈q〉t = −
Fqq
2Fq
{(∑nj=1 σoFsjFq )2 +∑i σ2 F 2siF 2q }
−Fqq2Fq
∑
i[
∫
Θ
γ2Fsi
Fq
µ(dθ)]2
which goes to:
−ms(q)2m(q)σ2o(q, .)
(39)
because
lim
∑
i
σ2F 2si = 0,
lim
n,
∑
i
[
∫
Θ
γ2Fsi
Fq
µ(dθ)]2 = 0.

−∑i FqsiFq d〈q, si〉t = −(∑i σoFsiFq )(∑j σo FqsjFq )
+
∑n
i=1 σ
2 Fqsi
Fq
.
Fsi
Fq
+
∑n
i=1
Fqsi
Fq
. [
∫
Θ
γ2µ(dθ)
Fq
Fsi ]
which goes to:
σo(q,.)
m(q) (σom)s(q),
(40)
as the terms
∑n
i=1 σ
2 Fqsi
Fq
.
Fsi
Fq
and
∑n
i=1
Fqsi
Fq
. [
∫
Θ
γ2µ(dθ)
Fq
Fsi ] vanish.
−∑i Fsisi2Fq d〈si〉t = −∑i Fsisi (σ2o+σ2+∫Θ γ2(si,.)µ(dθ))2Fq
which goes to:
− 12m(q) [m(σ2o + σ2 +
∫
Θ
γ2(s, .)µ(dθ))]s(q)
(41)
Summing the latter terms, we obtain
23

− limn, Fqq2Fq d〈q〉t − limn,
∑
i
Fqsi
Fq
d〈q, si〉t − limn,
∑
i
Fsisi
2Fq
d〈si〉t
= − 12m(q){σ2o(q, .)ms(q)− 2σo(q, .)(σom)s(q)
+(mσ2o)s + (mσ
2)s + [m
∫
Θ
γ2(s, .)µ(dθ))]s}dt
= − 12m(q){σ2oms − 2σoσo,sm− 2σ2oms
+(mσ2o)s + (mσ
2)s + [m
∫
Θ
γ2(s, .)µ(dθ))]s}dt
= − 12m(q){−σ2oms − 2σoσo,sm+ (mσ2o)s + [m
∫
Θ
γ2(s, .)µ(dθ))]s}dt
− 12m(q) (mσ2)sdt
= − 12m(q) (mσ2)s(q)dt− 12m(q) [m
∫
Θ
γ2(s, .)µ(dθ))]sdt
(42)
Equation (37) becomes
dq = b¯(q, q, a(q, .))dt+ σo(q, q, a(q, .))dBo
− 12m(q) (mσ2)s(q)dt− 12m(q) [m
∫
Θ
γ2µ(dθ))]sdt
= b¯(q, q, a(q, .))dt+ σo(q, q, a(q, .))dBo
−σ(q, .)σs(q, .)dt− σ22 ms(q)m(q) dt
− ∫ γ(q, .)γs(q, .)µ(dθ)dt− ∫Θ γ2µ(dθ)2 ms(q)m(q) dt
(43)
This completes the proof.
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